Brief to the Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment, and Natural Resources
This brief examines the economic and structural forces that drive tobacco companies to target youth in their marketing strategies. While the industry publicly insists that its marketing efforts are limited to adult consumers, internal documents and marketing research reveal a contrasting reality. The following sections expand on the evidence and arguments, providing both historical context and reflections on how these practices continue to affect public health today.
The Economics of Youth Smoking
Tobacco addiction has long been described as a pediatric disease. Research indicates that fewer than one-third of smokers (31%) begin smoking after the age of 18, and only 5% start after the age of 24. This early initiation of smoking is not accidental; it is the result of deliberate marketing strategies designed to hook young consumers.
An internal report from 1984 by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company’s Marketing Department, titled Younger Adult Smokers: Strategies and Opportunities, clearly stated these figures. The report underscores the economic imperative for tobacco companies to secure lifelong customers by recruiting smokers at an early age.
In Canada, by 1994, roughly 80% of smokers had taken their first puff before reaching adulthood. A U.S. Surgeon General report noted that those who start smoking at an early age are at a higher risk of developing severe nicotine addiction later in life. Updated research from Health Canada further emphasizes that a significant number of smokers aged 15 to 17 reported trying their first cigarette before the age of 12.
Additionally, brand loyalty is established very early in a smoker’s career. Even when marketing initiatives are ostensibly designed to encourage brand switching among adult smokers, the efforts tend to target young people who are more likely to experiment with different brands. As documented in an internal statement from the early 1980s by R.J. Reynolds, even if a brand loses favor with young adult smokers, the high consumption rates among established customers prolong its market life.
It is also noteworthy that tobacco companies frequently refer to underage smokers as “younger adult smokers,” a linguistic tactic that obscures the reality of their recruitment strategies.
Canadian Market Examples
Historical documents from Canadian tobacco companies illustrate that the trends observed in the United States are no less pronounced in Canada. A 1982 document from British-American Tobacco, obtained by the British Columbia government from the Guildford depository in England, analyzed Canadian market trends and highlighted a startling disparity: while about 40% of smokers intended to quit, only 1.8% had succeeded in doing so in 1981.
“Our information on starting is limited since we do not conduct research with people under the age of 15. However, all of our data—and especially starting rates among people over the age of 15—suggest that starting is up since the ’76 launch of ‘lights.’”
It is important to note that in 1976 it was illegal to sell cigarettes to 15-year-olds in Canada, underscoring the deliberate nature of these marketing strategies.
In 1985, an Imperial Tobacco document described a troubling trend:
“Profit growth has camouflaged the reality that Canadian cigarette smokers are increasingly less enchanted with being smokers… Despite short-term upturns (e.g., via ‘lights’), fewer and fewer Canadians will smoke in the future… Although we have historically done things which had an influence on the size of the total industry, these efforts have not been coordinated, planned, and fully integrated into our ‘normal’ activities… Something’s got to change!”
There are two primary ways to influence the overall market size for tobacco. The first is to prevent current smokers from quitting, such as by promoting ‘health reassurance’ cigarettes like so-called ‘light’ cigarettes. The second, and more effective strategy, is to recruit new smokers—predominantly underage individuals. Evidence shows that Canadian companies have engaged in both strategies.
Imperial Tobacco, for example, has excelled in recruiting new smokers. In a presentation to executives from British American Tobacco companies in 1988, Imasco Chairman Purdy Crawford stated:
“I.T.L. [Imperial Tobacco Limited] has always focused its efforts on new smokers, believing that early perceptions tend to stay with them throughout their lives. I.T.L. clearly dominates the young adult market today and stands to prosper as these smokers age and as it maintains its highly favorable youthful preference.”
Imperial’s market share reportedly increased from just over one-third in the mid-1970s to around 70% by the time of this report, highlighting the long-term profitability of targeting youth.
Redefining Youth Through “Switching”
A revealing document from August 1991—a “Switching Analysis” by Imperial Tobacco’s Market Analysis Group—illustrates another aspect of these strategies. Tobacco companies have long claimed that their marketing focuses solely on maintaining brand loyalty among adult smokers. However, this document redefines “switchers” to include underage starters.
“When we talk about a switcher we are talking about someone who has been smoking his usual brand for less than 12 months. The definition includes starters (those who did not smoke before) and smokers who had no regular or particular previous brand.”
The document further explains the significance of youth in the tobacco market:
“Trends show that switching decreases with age. In 1990 the annual switching rate among smokers aged under 25 was double that of total smokers (20% versus 10%) and more than three times that of smokers aged 35 and over (6%). Young smokers experiment with different brands when they start, and after age 25 they tend to settle on one. Therefore, if our trademarks are relevant to smokers under 25, they will choose our brands and remain loyal well beyond age 25.”
These findings underline a troubling reality: even if marketing efforts were confined to current adult smokers, the nature of these strategies inherently makes cigarettes more attractive to underage and experimental users.
Marketing to Youth
Evidence of deliberate youth-targeted marketing is extensive. In the early 1990s, during challenges to the federal Tobacco Products Control Act, the Supreme Court of Canada examined internal tobacco industry documents that revealed a stark contrast between public statements and internal practices.
“Perhaps the most compelling evidence concerning the connection between advertising and consumption can be found in the internal marketing documents prepared by the tobacco manufacturers themselves. Although the appellants steadfastly argue that their marketing efforts are directed solely at maintaining and expanding brand loyalty among adult smokers, these documents show otherwise.”
One notorious example is the 1982 study, Project Plus/Minus, conducted by Kwechansky Marketing Research Inc. on behalf of Imperial Tobacco. This study examined why children experiment with cigarettes, how they begin smoking, and how they become addicted. Key findings included:
- Serious smoking typically begins between the ages of 14 and 18, driven by social factors and peer pressure.
- Young starters are aware of the risks of smoking but often believe that these risks will not affect them because they do not anticipate becoming addicted.
- Once addicted, smokers develop rationalizations that help them cope with the known hazards.
- The desire to quit smoking appears earlier than in previous generations, often emerging even before the completion of high school, though the actual act of quitting remains extremely challenging.
In addition, the study noted that aside from major brands like Player’s, Export, and du Maurier, there was little positive association with other brands among young smokers. Some brands like Belvedere and Craven fared only marginally better.
For example, Imperial Tobacco’s internal documents stated:
“The single most popular brand, and the one that seems to have become the customary badge among young males in particular (and among females very commonly too), was Player’s Light. That this brand went from introduction to an incredibly lofty posture in relatively few years is truly a marketing success story.”
Player’s Light was deliberately crafted to appeal to youth through its taste, nicotine delivery, package imagery, and advertising messages that evoked themes of autonomy and adventure. One advertisement guideline specified that the activities shown should be those that young people aged 16 to 20 either practice or aspire to.
Although some argue that such predatory strategies belong to the past, contemporary campaigns continue to employ similar themes. For instance, Imperial Tobacco’s “Go Your Own Way” campaign for Player’s cigarettes emphasizes youthful autonomy and outdoor adventure, even though it is presented as a sponsorship advertisement for car racing. Similarly, recent Export ‘A’ ads on television employ juvenile humor and visual gags reminiscent of past campaigns, clearly aimed at capturing the attention of a younger audience.
Industry-Sponsored Youth Access Programs
In addition to direct marketing, the tobacco industry also sponsors “youth access programs” that remind retailers not to sell tobacco products to minors. The most recent incarnation in Canada is the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers’ Council’s “Operation ID” program.
At first glance, such programs might be interpreted as evidence that the industry is serious about preventing youth smoking. However, historical evidence—especially from the United States—suggests that these initiatives serve a different purpose. For example, the Tobacco Institute in the U.S., which functioned similarly to the CTMC until its disbandment, launched a youth program called “It’s the Law.” A 1991 internal document revealed the true intent:
“The youth program and its individual parts support the Institute’s objective of discouraging unfair and counterproductive federal, state, and local restrictions on cigarette advertising by:
– Providing ongoing and persuasive evidence that the industry is actively discouraging youth smoking and independent verification that the industry’s efforts are valid;
– Reinforcing the belief that peer pressure—not advertising—is the primary cause of youth smoking;
– Seizing the political center and forcing anti-smokers to an extreme position.”
In other words, these programs are designed not to reduce youth smoking but to forestall stricter government regulation by promoting the notion that the industry is self-regulating.
This tactic was further illustrated in 1995 when Philip Morris’s Senior Vice President, Steve Parrish, explained to the company’s board how a potentially negative anti-smoking campaign in Moscow was transformed into a positive, youth-oriented billboard campaign with the tagline “Smoking can wait.”
“…the Moscow city government was preparing to run a very negative anti-smoking billboard campaign. PM was present at a meeting on the issue and offered to take part in the program provided it focused solely on youth. As a result, what might have been a broad, very negative campaign was transformed into a positive, youth-oriented billboard program carrying the tag line ‘Smoking can wait.’”
Across the globe, such industry-sponsored programs share key characteristics:
- They emphasize that smoking is an “adult choice” by focusing on legal restrictions to underage smoking, despite the appeal these messages have for teenagers.
- They provide little to no information about the severe health risks and the addictive nature of tobacco.
- They deliberately omit discussion of the tobacco industry’s role in recruiting youth.
While enforcement of age restrictions is necessary, it must be part of a comprehensive strategy that reduces demand for tobacco, educates the public about its dangers, and holds the industry accountable.
Change Is Possible
Although initiatives like Operation ID have not convinced many observers of their sincerity, there is a significant policy change that could have a meaningful impact on tobacco industry practices. The government should implement a system of penalties that directly holds tobacco companies financially accountable every time a young person becomes addicted.
This approach would be similar to the ‘look-back’ provisions proposed in the McCain Bill in the United States and other legislative proposals from the late 1990s. For example, companies could be fined an amount equivalent to three times the profits they would expect from a new underage smoker’s lifetime consumption. Such penalties would create a strong financial disincentive for marketing strategies that target youth.
Under this system, tobacco companies would be compelled to actively prevent youth smoking. Moreover, companies might even publicly criticize competitors engaged in targeting minors, prompting an industry-wide shift in promotional practices to make their products less attractive to young people.
It is crucial to understand that the recruitment of underage smokers is not the work of a few rogue individuals; rather, it is a cornerstone of the tobacco industry’s long-term profitability. Although sales to minors may account for only a small share of annual profits, the vast majority of long-term gains come from customers who were recruited before reaching adulthood. Thus, industry claims regarding efforts to curb youth smoking must be viewed against this stark business reality.
I urge this committee to consider innovative and decisive measures to curb the tobacco epidemic, measures that hold the industry financially accountable and ultimately protect our youth from the devastating effects of tobacco addiction.
